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A Rising Star?: Halal Consumer Protection Laws
The business opportunities relating to halal food|the Islamic faith's analog to kosher food|are on the verge
of exploding.1 In both the United States and Europe, as Islam solidies its space as the fastest growing
religion in both regions, Muslims are beginning to assert their need and desire for halal food. In New Jersey
and Minnesota, each of the State legislatures recently passed \halal consumer fraud protection" laws, akin
to the kosher versions that had existed for some time in the two states.2 The fact that the two laws were
passed within a short span of time hints that critical mass is likely to be but a handful of states away, and
many speculate that it will not be long until most states have their own version of a similar statute.3 Finally,
another testament to this upward trend can be found in some Michigan elementary schools, where parents
are demanding that their children be given access to halal food.4
However, without a doubt, the single most explosive business opportunity for halal meat stems from the
increasing globalization of most consumer goods, including food. As trade barriers and taris fall with the
incorporation of more nations into the WTO and GATT agreements, the possibility of exporting food to the
Muslim world|comprising 1.3 billion people overall|becomes a most tantalizing possibility for players in
1Dierences between kosher and halal are subtle but numerous, and will be explored in further detail later in the piece. For
the purposes of introducing the subject matter in a broad brush stroke, equating the two as analogs serves as a convenient
shorthand.
2David Gibson, Jersey Gives Its Blessing to Muslim Dietary Practices, New Jersey Star-Ledger, June 18, 2000, at B5.
3Elizabeth Sabah, A Raft of Changes at http://www.religionnews.com/arc00/f 0131.html.
4Gibson, supra note 2.
1the food industry.5 Because many companies have realized signicant increases in revenue after becoming
kosher-certied, those that are eyeing halal-certication project signicantly larger jumps in business, given
the fact that the raw potential market for halal dwarfs that of its kosher cousin. The prospect that rst
movers are likely to lock-up long-term relationships with countries with signicant Muslim populations|
such as Indonesia, Egypt, China, and Malaysia|is adding an element of frenzy to an already erce race.
As these countries begin to adopt stringent tests to determine the acceptability of particular imports, the
critical need for American businesses to understand what halal is becomes underscored.
The objective of this paper is to explore the legal aspects of the nascent halal regime in the United States. In
Part I, an introduction to halal dietary laws is given. In Part II, a summary history of the halal industry|
both business and legal|is exposited. Part III is an in-depth analysis of possible key learnings that can
be gleaned from the kosher regime in America. Here, the similarities and dierences between kosher and
halal, a brief look at kosher developments, and the constitutional issues that have recently been plaguing
kosher statutes are explored. Part IV attempts to tie the three previous sections together and considers the
practical obstacles a successful halal regime will need to overcome. Finally, Part V concludes with a few
suggestions and a look ahead.
Part I: Halal|Islamic Dietary Laws
The rules governing halal food derive|as do all rules and norms that govern the life of a Muslim|from
the Koran (the holy book of Muslims, believed to be divinely revealed) and the Sunna (the living practices
of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him)).6 The laws relating to diet|a small subset
5M. M. Chaudry, Islamic Foods Move Slowly Into Marketplace, in Meat Processing, 31, 34-38 (1997).
6It is customary for authors of works relating to Islam to add the phrase \peace and blessings be upon him" after mentioning
the name of any of the prophets described in either the Old Testament, New Testament, or the Koran. Out of respect for this
tradition, the present writer will do so throughout this piece.
2of the these laws and recommendations that touch almost every aspect of a Muslim's life|deal with three
main issues: 1. Prohibited and permitted animals, 2. Method of slaughter, and 3. Prohibition of impure
substances. We will deal with each one of these in turn.
Prohibited and permitted animals
Meat of pigs, boars, and swine are prohibited, as is that of all carnivorous animals such as lions, dogs, and
cats. This applies to birds of prey as well, such as eagles, falcons, and vultures. Herbivores, on the other
hands, are completely permissible, e.g. cattle, sheep, goat, and lamb. Birds that don't use their claws to
hold down meat are also permissible, such as geese, quails, chickens, turkey, and ducks. Permitted animals
that are fed lthy feed (such as that which is mixed with sewage) are required to be quarantined and given
clean feed for 40 days in order for their systems to have cleansed. After this period of time, slaughtering
may proceed.7
All aquatic game except frogs and crocodiles are permitted for consumption. A dierence of opinion is shown
in one view that holds that game that does not live 100% in the water is permitted, but discouraged for
consumption. Hence, lobsters, clam, and crabs are generally eaten, but sometimes frowned upon by some
practitioners. Additionally, all milk and eggs from permitted animals are themselves permitted. Finally, it
is important to note one marked dierence from kosher laws: there is no rule that disallows the mixing of
meat and milk.8
7Carol J. Waslien, Muslim Dietary Laws, Nutrition, and Food Processing, in Encyclopedia of Food Science and
Technology, Volume 2, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1840, 1848-1850 (1992).
8Id. at 1851.
3Method of slaughter
The requirements for halal slaughtering are remarkably close to those found in a kosher regime.9 First,
the animal must be in the halal category, i.e. an herbivore or the birds mentioned above. Second, the
individual performing the slaughter must be an adult Muslim. Third, the name of God must be pronounced
at the moment of slaughter. Finally, the throat must be cut in a manner that brings about complete and
fast bleeding which would result in the most rapid death. The agreed-upon method for fullling this last
condition is to cut three of the four main passages, i.e. jugulars, esophagus, trachea, and carotids.10 Some
of the philosophical and ecological aspects of these four steps will be discussed in greater detail below. For
now, it is sucient to note that these requirements of slaughter are necessary only for land animals. Aquatic
game do not need to be slaughtered in any way. Finally, animals that die of disease, strangulation, a fall
from a height, natural diseases, or through any other means that does not involve the slaughter described
above, are considered unlawful. Stunning an animal to death, a practice that is done with some frequency
on non-halal ranches, would make its meat o limits.
Impure Substances
The nal issue that halal dietary law deals with is that of impure substances. Under this category are a
number of things, including blood, excrement, wine, any liquid intoxicant (namely, alcohol), and the milk
of animals that may not be eaten. The two that are most commonly at issue are alcohol and blood. With
respect to alcohol, all uses are prohibited, including during the cooking process|despite the fact that most
9Id. at 1853.
10Nuh Keller, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law 365 (Amana Publications,
Beltsville, Maryland) (1994).
4of the alcohol evaporates. More will be said about variant opinions relating to alcohol in the section below
on diering interpretations.11 Blood is a universally agreed upon impurity in the Islamic context: all blood
from meat must be drained, and items such as blood sausage are impermissible. The prohibition against
blood in its most common form|as a liquid|would disappoint only Dracula.
Dierent schools of thought
It should be noted that although Muslim scholars agree on a most issues, Islamic jurisprudence has left
a considerable amount of room for diering interpretations of rules and laws.12 As mentioned near the
introduction, Islamic law is based on the directives found in the Koran, as well as those found in the Sunna.
These various Sunna were preserved in writing as hadith{written records of a word or deed of the Prophet
(peace and blessings be upon him). Later generations of scholars were left with the task of having to
determine which of these hadiths were accurate and which were forged, how to read one hadith in light of
another, the implications of diering grammatical readings of the hadith, etc. As one might well imagine, a
tradition that encourages qualied scholarship to explore additional levels of meaning in a particular text is
bound to give rise to multiple interpretations.13
Historically, these multiple interpretations have occurred within the context of the four great madhahib
(schools of thought), which were formed through the collective eort of successive generations of scholars
working in a collaborative fashion. Though the rulings on the vast majority of legal questions were usually
similar, there were a number of issues where, for example, something would be permitted in one school
11This is an area of tremendous confusion, even among practicing Muslims in America. Because of the highly detailed nature
of the food manufacturing process, the amount of alcohol that evaporates, the percentage that is permissible, and the safeguards
necessary to insure compliance with halal standards, scholars have expressed dierences of opinion on its permissibility.
12Mustafa Azami, Studies in Early Hadith Literature 217 (American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, Indiana) (1992).
13Id. at 223.
5of thought, disliked in another, and not allowed in a third. This diversity of views|as long as it was
rooted in rigorous methodology exercised by qualied scholars|was considered a blessing.14 A Muslim,
upon confronting a situation that was unbearably dicult to deal with according to the laws derived by
his particular school of thought, could take a dispensation and follow the ruling found in another school of
thought. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself said: \The dierences in my community
are a manifestation of mercy".15 It is this balance between rigorous tradition and a exibility that allows
for lively debate and dierences of opinion|which is itself an outgrowth of this rigorous tradition|that
has given traditional Islamic jurisprudence its life-force, allowing it to exist and thrive fourteen centuries
after the basic principles were laid down. The way these dierences of opinion play out can be seen quite
markedly in discussions surrounding the permissibility/prohibition of certain foods. Three brief examples
will be mentioned, and the discussion will be limited to comparing and contrasting the two most-followed
madhabs in the Islamic world: the Sha'i madhab and the Hana madhab.16
. The rst example is that of alcohol. According to the Sha'i madhab, anything which contains alcohol
is considered impure, and is consequently not permissible for consumption. However, a number of liquid
avors such as vanilla contain alcohol.17 In fact, the use of alcohol is quite common for reasons such as
avor extraction and standardization, as well as ingredient precipitation. What is someone who diligently
follows the position of the Sha'i madhab to do? One option is to avoid items that have alcohol in them,
which would eectively remove whole categories of food from his menu. Another option is to wait for food
manufacturers to respect this restriction, and to use permitted substitute products in the meantime, such
as grain or synthetic alcohol instead of the impermissible ethyl alcohol. Unless manufacturers learn of a
14Id.
15See id. at 225.
16Waffa Shaqra, A Glossary of Islamic Terminology, 25 (Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd, London) (1992).
17Roger Othman, Alcohol|A Drink/A Chemical, 1 Halal Consumer, 12, 13 (Fall 2000).
6signicant market need, it is unlikely that these changes will be implemented any time soon. As such, this
wait-and-see approach is not a real option. A third possibility is to look to an alternative school of thought,
in this case the Hana madhab. According to this school of thought, liquid avors containing alcohol such as
natural vanilla are considered pure because they are neither produced nor intended as intoxicants.18 Here,
the Hana scholars use largely the same textual sources available to the Sha'i scholars, but by employing
a dierent methodology, arrive at a legal ruling that permits this commonly used ingredient.
A second example is that of gelatin. This substance, generally made from pork skins, is a hotly debated issue
in the kosher community. Likewise, it is something that is frequently discussed in halal circles. According to
the Sha'i madhab, gelatin is categorically forbidden if it comes from animals that aren't permissible to eat,
i.e. pig or unslaughtered cattle or beef. However, Hana scholars hold fast to the general methodological
principle that something impure which is transformed at the molecular level into a new substance has become
pure. A common example is parts of a pig (impure) becoming soap (pure).; the same reasoning applies to
gelatin.19 The chemical process that is undertaken is, according to Hana scholars, signicant enough that
the resultant product|though of pig origin|no longer bears a close resemblance to the original object. As
such, it is now considered pure and is acceptable for consumption.20
A third and nal example is that of rennet and other animal-based enzymes. The Sha'i madhab holds
that such enzymes that come from unslaughtered animals are impermissible for consumption. However,
Hanas hold that many parts of an unslaughtered dead animal are permissible, including its bones, hair,
nails, horns, and rennet.21 For this reason, the current industry standard of using rennet and other enzymes
18Id. at 15.
19Keller, supra note 10, at 368.
20Yusuf Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, 128 (The Holy Koran Publishing House, Beirut, Lebanon)
(1984).
21Id. at 132.
7in the cheese-making process is compatible with the Hana position.
It is important to make a distinction here between the Islamic attitudes towards dierences of opinion and the
closely related but philosophically dierent ones found in Jewish jurisprudence. In the latter, there is a sense
of a hierarchy of strictness: One can expect to nd the more `conservative' positions in Orthodox teachings
and the more `liberal' positions in Reform circles.22 However, in the Islamic context, one is hard-pressed to
guess which school of thought will have the more `lenient' position towards a particular question. This is
because what marks the dierent schools of thought is not so much an attitude of ease or rigorousness, but
rather a particular methodology that is used in a case-by-case fashion to arrive at a ruling about something.
The fact that the Hana position closely matched our intuitions about which of the two rulings was more
`liberal' is in large part coincidental. Many other issues of jurisprudence have the Sha'i position appearing
to be the more \liberal", or have both the Sha'i and the Hana seem `strict' when compared to a third
school of thought.23 Having said this, it is nonetheless fair and accurate to say that it is commonly recognized
by jurists that the Hana position gives the most exibility with respect to food issues.
Philosophical Basis of Halal Laws
Before examining the current state of the halal industry in the United States, it would behoove us to
briey throw into high relief some of the principles that drive the halal regime by looking at three concrete
examples: the rules of slaughtering, of hunting, and a particular decision calculus that involves eating from
impermissible foods.
22Waslien, supra note 7, at 1842
23An example can be found in the prayer-orientation. Muslims must face the direction of Mecca for prayer, but the dierent
schools of thought have a range of acceptable error when using a compass to determine direction. While the Hana school
permits a range of plus/minus 45 degrees, and the Maliki school permits plus/minus 90 degree, the Shaf'i school permits only
a 15 degree dierence.
8The Islamic rules concerning animals are uncompromising about the need for their humane treatment,
particularly those that are to be slaughtered. The default position is that all life is sacred, and that the
taking of a life for any reason is an absolute enormity. The elixir that turns this absolute prohibition into
something allowable is permission from the Divine. Were it not a fact that the Koran and Sunna allow
slaughtering animals for the purpose of food, some scholars have argued that it would be impermissible to
eat them at all.24
It is against this backdrop that the meticulous rules of etiquette vis a vis ritual slaughter make sense. First,
the animal is to be given adequate rest and water. Second, an authentic hadith commands the slaughterman
not to sharpen his knife in front of the animal, a commandment rooted in the idea that any harm|physical
or emotional|to the animal that is beyond what is strictly necessary is blameworthy. Third, the knife used
must be sharp, and the throat must be cut in such a manner that results in complete bleeding and the
quickest death. If the blade strikes a chicken through the head or chest rather than neck, it is considered a
sin, and the resultant meat is impermissible.25 In an age where machine slaughtering of chicken is far more
ecient than traditional hand-slaughtering, such rules serve to incentivize the slaughtermen to honor the
humane treatment; if not, the goods of eciency will come at the cost of the permissibility of the slaughtered
meat.
A second manifestation of this uncompromising demand to keep to that which is strictly necessary are the
Islamic rules that pertain to hunting. Wild animals like deer and birds such as doves, quails, and pheasants
can be hunted only for the purpose of eating; hunting such game for the thrill of the hunt, as it were, is
categorically forbidden.26 Though tools such as arrows, trapping equipment, hunting animals, or guns are
all permissible, there are constraints in their use. For example, if an arrow hits an animal and then the
animal drops into water, the game animal is impermissible to eat. The reasoning here is that since the
24Keller, supra note 10, at 371.
25Waslien, supra note 7, at 1847.
26Id. at 1848.
9animal might have died from drowning rather than from being shot, and that the former is a `cruel' means
of killing the game, its meat is impermissible. Another instance involves the use of a hunting animal: if the
animal used is trained, then the game captured is permissible for consumption; otherwise, the game is not
permissible to eat. One explanation given for the logic behind such detailed rules is that they serve to put
Muslim hunters on alert: unless specic etiquette is followed, the game captured or killed is impermissible,
and the hunter then carries the sin of taking life for no justiable reason.27 Moreover, such impermissibility
serves to incentivize the hunter to be careful about how he goes about his business: if the game he kills is
at the end of the day impermissible, his eorts will have gone to waste. Here, the larger Islamic principles
of avoiding excess and maintaining balance is displayed by what might otherwise appear to be unnecessary
details.28
Finally, a third short rule pertaining to food underlines some of the principles earlier mentioned. If one is
forced to eat from an impermissibly slaughtered animal out of fear of losing life or an illness getting worse,
then doing so is permitted.29 It is generally understood that this should be accompanied with restraint to
limit oneself to the minimum that is necessary. A more revealing hypothetical pits one with a choice between
eating a) impermissible meat such as pork or unslaughtered beef, and b) meat that is permissible, but that
belongs to someone else. Here, despite the clear prohibition and tremendous sin that are attributed to eating
unslaughtered meat|as well as the various warnings in Islamic jurisprudence that such a person's prayers
will not be accepted for a lengthy period of time|the primacy of respect and honor for the property of
another human being tips the scale.30
27Keller, supra note 10, at 365.
28Id. at 366.
29Id. at 368.
30Id. at 371.
10PART II: Halal dietary laws in america
Having explored some general principles and several specic examples of these halal dietary rules, the next
logical move is to examine how these laws are being applied in a U.S. context.
Summary History of Halal in America
The halal industry had a slow, plodding start in the United States. For many years, the industry was
characterized by a series of mom-and-pop shops owned and operated largely by immigrant workers.31 These
shops tended to grow out of and cluster around areas of ethnic concentration. The languages at these shops
spoken included Urdu, Malay, Somali, and Arabic, and operated according to a neighborhood-friendly ethos.
In this environment, the meat was slaughtered by a local butcher, and the neighborhood imam|religious
leader|supervised the process and vouched for its permissibility.32 As the demand for halal increased,
store owners found it easier and cheaper to buy from non-local distributors who were able to leverage
the economies of scale; one of the trade-os was that these local store owners became more lax in their
monitoring of incoming meat, and did not always take the necessary steps to insure that it was slaughtered
in an appropriate manner.33
One of the leading Muslim newsmagazines in the Unites States, The Minaret, found that up to 65% of
Islamic stores in southern California were selling non-halal products as halal.34 The conductors of the survey
attributed this to both deception and simple ignorance. Another Muslim non-prot, the Washington-based
31Ahmed Sakr, Islamic Dietary Laws and Practices, 58 (Bedford Park, Illinois) (1983).
32Id. at 61.
33Chaudry, supra note 5, at 37.
34Aslam Hathout, Islamic Food: The Sleeping Giant, The Minaret Magazine, March 2000, at 28.
11Council on American-Islamic Relations, called the status quo a \Wild West".35 Despite this less-than-optimal
health of the halal industry, commentators all agree that the market for halal is on the verge of exploding.
This upward trajectory brings with its own blessings and curses; many have suggested that the near-term
threat to the already-crippled integrity of halal will come primarily from the large industrial players as these
businesses wake to the prospect of this explosive market.36
A number of events indicate that this rapid growth is just around the corner. Two laws were passed
recently|within several months of each other|that aimed to protect halal consumers from fraudulent
sellers.37 Another incident in 1997 involved the US Department of Agriculture ning a Virginia meat producer
$15,000 for intentionally mislabeling ordinary meat as halal.38 In many ways, the Muslim community is
developing along a similar track to that which Jews and kosher tread many decades ago, as well as that
of the organic community in its quest for authentic organic food|a period of slow growth and relatively
adequate-but-loose community enforcement, followed by a rapid growth and an accompanying sense of mild
anarchy with respect to authentication, then a demand for standards and consumer protection, and nally
the establishment of consensus-based uniform standards.39 The last two areas will be explored in some detail
in a later section of this work.
35Id. at 30.
36Chaudry, supra note 5, at 39.
37Sabah, supra note 3.
38Gibson, supra note 2, at B11.
39Whether or not the halal regime will tread this path to completion is unclear. Kosher and organic foods developed very
strong market share, and could command legislation that protect their regimes, albeit not as strongly as the regime proponents
would like. Because halal is an-ultra young industry in the American context, how fast it moves along this life-cycle is something
that we will have to take a wait-and-see attitude towards.
12Why the Halal Regime was Slow in Developing
In order to better think through how the halal industry can best develop in the coming decade, it is valuable
to rst give some thought to why this halal revolution did not happen sooner. If strategists ignore to study
and diagnose historical obstacles, there is a likelihood that these same obstacles will re-appear. The question
of \why so long for the halal revolution", then, is as relevant for the next decade as it was to the past one.
There are at least three possible answers that shed light on why the halal industry|despite wide consensus
that views it as a latent powerhouse|is as yet woefully underdeveloped.40
The rst answer places the blame on a fundamental misunderstanding that has plagued Muslims in the United
States. The Koran makes permissible the meat of the \People of the Book", i.e. Jews and Christians.41 All
qualied religious scholars have traditionally interpreted this to mean meat that is slaughtered by Jews and
Christians in keeping with their respective religious laws.42 Good-hearted Muslim immigrants in the 1960's,
as part of an overall attempt to join America's melting pot without rocking the boat, took things at face
value.
Because America considers itself a Christian country, and individual Christians consider God to be an
important part of their life, these early Muslim immigrants gave the benet of the doubt and concluded
that the meat these Christians were slaughtering was, by virtue of their professed adherence to Christianity,
acceptable to Muslims. It did not take long for them to realize that the slaughterhouses for Safeway and
other national chains|though made up of self-proclaimed religiously-minded individuals|were not being
operated according to any religious methodology. The name of God was not recited|an absolute requirement
for Muslims. This disqualication of the Christian half of the \People of the Book" left the possibility of Jews
40This \sleeping giant" phenomena has bothered those who are deeply involved in the industry. The market is enormous,
but foot-dragging seems to keep things from proceeding along a faster track.
41Muslims are taught to accord people of faith, especially Jews and Christians, unwavering respect. The \People of the Book"
designation is meant to be one of nobility and honor.
42Jafar Qaderi, The Food of Ahlul-Kitab, 1 Halal Consumer 21 (Fall 2000).
13and kosher. Here, though the requirements for slaughter are quite similar, a problem exists in that kosher
does not ban alcohol.43 Consequently, foods that contain|for example|vanilla are considered kosher, but
not halal. Other more technical considerations exist, but the upshot is that neither kosher nor modern-day
Christian dietary rules are an adequate substitute for halal.44
Though some of the above facts do not come as a surprise to many learned Muslims, it is still common today
to nd large numbers of Muslims who are unable to articulate the dierences between kosher and halal. In
fact, most Muslims in the U.S. are unaware that kosher permits alcohol and would be shocked upon learning
of this fact. Detailing how and why knowledge-based traditional Islamic jurisprudence lost its way is beyond
the scope of this work.45 For our purposes, it is enough to note that because kosher was widely considered to
be a perfectly acceptable substitute for halal, many Muslims simply did not feel a pressing need to develop
the industry rapidly. The maxim, \Necessity is the mother of invention", and its corollary (\...mother of
industry"), was the prevailing logic: as long as Muslims did not feel that developing halal was a necessity|
because of the perception that acceptable substitutes were easily on-hand|no invention/industry followed.46
Now, with better consumer awareness that kosher and halal are similar but not synonymous, as well as other
reasons that will be explored elsewhere in this piece, Muslims are actively demanding a full-edged halal
industry.
A second set of reasons that account for the slow development of this industry are purely tactical, and relate
to issues of organization and coordination for Muslims in America that go far beyond food. Few non-prots
exist, the ones that do tend to overlap in much of their work, centralization and joint projects are few, and
community funds are poorly spent.47 There is a general lack of authority, which has given rise to numerous
43Othman, supra note 17, at 14.
44Qaderi, supra note 42, 22.
45This phenomena has lead some to state that an \American Islam" is developing, one that mirrors the early evolution of
Protestantism in America. However, it does seem as though the pendulum is swinging back in the direction of a classical,
school-of-thought-based understanding of the religion.
46Gibson, supra note 2, at B11.
47Masood Uthman, Muslim Politics in America, The Minaret Magazine, January 2001, at 12.
14splinter groups. The sheer diversity of Muslims in America|a combination of immigrants from Ethiopia to
Indonesia to Bosnia and China|joining with American-born converts is daunting, and makes community
coordination dicult to achieve. Obviously, any eorts to watchdog agri-business or push for legislative
reform to protect halal consumers requires political savvy rooted in a strong voting base.48 Consequently,
the absence of these things has|at least until quite recently|created a sense of stagnation.
A third possible reason, similar to the one just exposited, has little to do with food-specic factors as such.
Simply put, immigrant Muslims in America have been transitioning to life in the West, and the issues that
greet immigrants are complicated and numerous. Because of the wide perception of kosher-as-substitute,
as well as the serious concerns that Muslims in America faced as a developing minority over the past two
decades, halal was simply relegated to the bottom of the agenda.49 Given this prioritization scheme of
immigrant Muslims, it is not surprising that the real push for authentically halal products and related halal
consumer fraud laws has come from a number of American-born converts to Islam.50
Where the Industry Stands Today
Putting aside these past failings, it is clear that halal is poised to explode. Already mentioned as evidence of
this market growth are the large-scale producers who are entering the game, the two recent state consumer
fraud laws, and the visibly increased demand for halal products. In addition, countries with large Muslim
populations have become increasingly discriminating about products that purport to be halal. For example,
analytic laboratories have been set up at their ports-of-entry to test for precise alcohol contents in food.51
48Id. at 15
49Hathout, supra note 34, at 29.
50Uthman, supra note 47, at 15.
51Alan Sams, Poultry Meat Processing 115 (2001).
15The halal industry has reached a sort of `fork in the road': This sudden explosion in market size against a
backdrop of two decades of checkered success in developing the right business and legal infrastructure entails
that a great deal of work needs to be done in an accelerated fashion.
Part III: Lessons from the Kosher Regime
Throughout the descriptive portion of this piece, references have on occasion been made to the kosher
industry. In thinking about next steps for the halal industry, particularly with respect to suggesting a
workable legal structure that can help direct and foster this inevitable growth, it is well worth our time to
examine the related kosher system. In assessing its business ecacy and legal strength, much can be gained
for developing a halal blueprint. We will rst explore some of the similarities and dierences between halal
and kosher. Next, we will give a brief history of kosher in America. Finally, we will devote a fairly extensive
amount of thought to the constitutionality issues that are facing kosher, and by association, halal.
Similarities and Dierences in Kosher/Halal Dietary Laws
The kosher legal regime provides the closest analog to what a halal fraud statute might look like. The
similarities between halal and kosher are remarkable: both are religiously-based statutes, are part of a larger
life-transaction code of conduct, have a number of adherents in the United States, and involve both product
and process-based restrictions.52 Some of the specic guidelines with respect to process and product are
even more striking, such as the impermissibility of gelatin, the need for a humane ritual slaughter, and the
52Qaderi, supra 42, at 23.
16notion of sanctity with respect to food.53 Among the dierences are that Muslims can mix meat and milk,
need only to clean the utensils that are used interchangeably between halal and non-halal food, and are
categorically forbidden from using wine in either food or alone as a beverage.54
Stepping back to compare the two systems in a U.S. context shows additional dierences. While halal is in
its embryonic stages in the U.S., and food manufactures have been slow to adopt it as a standard, kosher
is a well-known and wildly popular reality in the food industry. Halal food is currently purchased primarily
by Muslim consumers, while kosher has spilled over to the mainstream in a signicant way. Some estimates
place the total number of non-Jewish purchasers of kosher food products at 75%.55 This last distinction
will be revisited and discussed in some depth below when exploring how much of the learnings from the
kosher experiences can be borrowed by the developing halal regime. The nal bird's-eye-view dierence is
that while kosher laws are being stricken on constitutional grounds and revised, halal laws are being written
with these constitutional challenges in mind, and are consequently being embraced by a number of states.56
Summary History of Kosher in America
Having explored some of the specic similarities and dierences between kosher and halal, it is best to now
turn our attention to examining how the kosher regime developed. By denition, kosher products are more
expensive than non-kosher counterparts, mainly due to the increased costs of supervision and labor required
in the kosher food production process.57 Because of religious/health needs, consumers have demonstrated
53J. Awan, Islamic Food Laws: Philosophy of the Prohibition of Unlawful Foods, in Science and Technology in the
Islamic World 133, 137 (1984).
54Id. at 138.
55Gibson, supra note 2, at B11.
56Id. at B5.
57Jonathan Slonim, Kosher Certiers Say Violations Are on the Rise, Forward, June 27, 1997, at 2.
17a willingness over the last century to pay a signicantly higher amount for a kosher product versus a non-
kosher one, all other things being equal. Because it is dicult, if not outright impossible to determine from
the appearance of the end product whether or not something is kosher, this|along with the higher margins
mentioned above|incentivizes dishonest merchants to sell their less-costly goods as higher-margin kosher
items.58
Consequently, before any laws were passed, lawlessness was the rule of the day. Fraud was all-too common,
and relatively little could be done about it. Many Jewish immigrants were still in the process of getting
to know their new homes, and local merchants|\kosher crooks" |took advantage of these newcomers.59
Though states like New York and Massachusetts tried to do away with some of this disorder by appointing
a \Chief Rabbi", opposition from the kosher food industry killed the proposals.60 In one famous letter often
quoted in kosher-history surveys, a Hungarian Jewish immigrant to the US wrote his rabbi in 1887 bemoaning
the miserable state of the kosher food industry.61 Finally, in 1891 New York passed the rst kosher food
law. Though it was a bare-bones version of a statute that was to be heavily revised and expanded, it was a
symbolic rst step. Massachusetts passed its own similar law one year later.62
The 1922 New York revisions to its 1891 kosher fraud law marked the real beginning of consumer protection.
Among other things, it forbade the sale of non-kosher meat as kosher. Further, it required stores that sold
both kosher and non-kosher to label each section accordingly. Punishment for violations included a ne or
jail term for small violations, and being charged with a felony for larger violations.63 Of course, as with
legislation in general, the eects took some time to be felt. It was estimated that in 1925, 40% of the meat
sold as kosher in New York City was in fact not kosher.64 The fact that internal information dynamics in this
58Id. at 4.
59Marc Stern, Kosher Food and the Law, 39 Judaism 389, 389 (1990).
60Harold Gastwirt, Fraud, Corruption, and Holiness: the Controversy Over the Supervision of Jewish Dietary
Practice in New York City 1881-1940 102 (James Shenton ed., 1974).
61Id.
62Stern, supra note 59, at 391.
63Gastwirt, supra note 60, at 108.
64Id. at 110.
18large concentration-center of Jewish individuals was not enough to keep fraudulent vendors from operating
successfully indicates that fraud rates were higher in less-organized Jewish centers.65 The statute was
supported by many Orthodox and Conservative Jewish groups, including the New York division of the United
Synagogue of America, the Union of Orthodox Rabbis and the Assembly of Orthodox Rabbis. Opposition
came from other Jewish groups, notably the Progressive Hebrew Butchers Protective Association, which
objected to dening \kosher" as \Orthodoxy". Despite their protests, the New York law was successfully
revised, and a similar law in California was passed in 1931.66 Once California and New York set the
standard, other states looked to these statutes and drafted their own, essentially using the New York law as
a template.67
What helped the New York statute replicate itself in form across several states was the fact that it was
able to withstand several legal challenges. In 1918, in People vs. Atlas, the challenging parties argued that
\kosher" was unconstitutionally vague; because rabbinical law determining what was or was not \kosher'
was ambiguous and imprecise, a specic denition was impossible to arrive at.68 The court rejected this
argument, and argued that the regulations in place required that a merchant have the intent to defraud a
consumer in order for a violation to be found. In other words, if a merchant believed in good faith that he
was selling kosher, he was immune to consequences under the New York statute. In 1922, the US Supreme
Court in Hygrade Provisions reiterated Atlas' nding, arguing that the term kosher had a suciently well-
dened meaning in trade, such that merchants would know what kosher meant.69 The fact that a great
deal of rabbinical disagreement was likely posed no constitutional problems, because of the intent to defraud
requirement of the statute. It should be noted that no Establishment Clause challenge was made in Hygrade,
largely because the First Amendment's Establishment Clause was thought to be inapplicable to state laws
65Id.
66Eli Schlossberg, The World of Orthodox Judaism 58 (1996).
67Id. at 65.
68People v. Atlas, 130 N.E. 921, 928 (N.Y. 1921).
69Hygrade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925)
19at the time the decision was made.70
The clear ruling by courts in Hygrade and Atlas kept challengers at bay for almost four decades.71 Other
challenges to New York-style statutes launched in other states were likewise unsuccessful. In Ehrlich v.
Municipal Court, a California court rejected the challengers' claims that \no two rabbis could agree on the
meaning of the term kosher".72 The threshold requirement of intent to defraud was again oered as a defense
to the statute. Eleven years later, in Sossin Systems v. City of Miami Beach, the defendant took a dierent
approach, arguing that an ordinance similar to New York's was in violation of the Establishment Clause.73
The court dismissed the claims in cursory fashion: \We are unable to view this ordinance as a legislative
enactment establishing or respecting the establishment of religion".74 A second major case dealing with a
possible Establishment Clause violation was Maryland's Barghout v. Mayor. Not surprisingly, the court
repeated the same standard arguments about the good faith provision of its New York-style ordinance. It
argued that Maryland's constitution did not forbid \establishment" of the religion in a way like the US
Constitution did.75 The question of whether or not this latter constitution was contravened was a question
that the Maryland courts left to the federal courts.
The impressive several-decade invincibility that kosher statutes enjoyed began to crack with the 1992 Ran-
Dav's County Kosher decision. By a four-to-three vote, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the use of
kosher standards was unconstitutional under Establishment Clause analysis.76 The Barghout suit followed
on the heels of Ran-Dav, and in 1995, the Fourth Circuit declared unanimously that the Baltimore kosher
70Catherine Beth Sullivan, Comment, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 Boston College Environmental
Law Review, 201, 205 (1993).
71Id. at 211.
72Ehrlich v. Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Jud. Dist., 360 P.2d 334 (1961)
73Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Apl. 1972).
74Id. at 40.
75Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1343 (4th Cir. 1995).
76Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
20fraud ordinance was unconstitutional.77 The proverbial nail in the con came when the Court in New
York|birthplace of the original kosher fraud laws and home to one of the largest population of Jews in the
world|echoed the sentiments of the previous two courts and declared that the New York statute was itself
unconstitutional.78 Commentators have pointed out that these three rulings in rapid succession are likely to
accelerate the pace that other state statutes are challenged and struck down. Until at least one court stops
this hemorrhaging by defending the constitutionality of these provisions, it is likely that the momentum will
claim more casualties.79
Evaluating the Constitutionality Issues
Because of the similarities between kosher and halal, and the modeling of the latter's statute-implementation
strategy on the former's, this change in legal attitude towards New York-style kosher statutes is most worthy
of attention for our purposes. Examining some of the Establishment Clause arguments presented by the
courts in the three aforementioned decisions will help in forecasting the future direction that courts are
likely to take. The Ran-Dav court made its decision by the slimmest of margins, indicating that there is a
possibility that future courts may go the other direction.80 Perhaps the best way to proceed is to examine
the arguments made by the anti-statute courts|using the Ran Dav Court's arguments as the model|and
to balance this with a defense of the constitutionality of these statutes. After getting a sense of the relative
merits of each position, we can then consider our conclusions in the specic context of a halal legal regime.
77Stephen Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 George
Washington Law Review, 951, 962 (1997).
78Benjamin Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to Organic Food, 108 Yale Law Journal
2351, 2355 (1999).
79Id. at 2359.
80Shelly Meacham, Note and Comment, Answering to a Higher Source: Does the Establishment Clause Actually Restrict
Kosher Regulations as Ran-Dav's County Kosher Proclaims?, 23 Southwestern University Law Review, 639, 641 (1994).
21A.
Secular purpose
One of the key elements of Establishment Clause analysis is that a statute must have a secular purpose.
Because this secular purpose prong requires only that the statute not be one that is \wholly motivated by
religious considerations", the vast majority of courts have permitted statutes that have a \plausible secular
purpose."81 With respect to kosher cases, such secular purposes have included, among other things, the
protection of \consumers who, for reasons of religion, conscience, quality or health, intend to purchase kosher
foods," and \to protect people from unscrupulous vendors who try to lure them into buying something less
than what they are entitled to expect."82 However, Judge D'Annunzio, the inuential New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Judge, argued that \almost every attempt by the State to police religious practice can be
justied as a legitimate attempt to prevent fraud." He then goes on to compare kosher protection laws to a
hypothetical regulation that \prohibits a church from designating itself as Christian unless it professes and
teaches the divinity of Jesus Christ."83
B.
Denominational Preference
A central concern of Establishment Clause analysis is that the state apply strict scrutiny to laws that
\facially dierentiate among religions," so as to prevent the beneting of one religion over another. One
81I am indebted to Stephen Rosenthal (supra, note 77) for helping to crystallize the structure for this section of the paper,
helping to analyze the sometimes unclear issues addressed by the court.
82Ran-Dav, 608 A.2d at 1358.
83Id. at 1359.
22possible weakness in the kosher laws is that eighteen out of twenty-two states with kosher laws equate kosher
with Orthodox standards.84 Given that there are three major schools of thought in Judaism|Orthodox,
Conservative, and Reform|one may well wonder whether or not this privileging of the Orthodox standard
harms those in the other two camps. However, this remains in the background as a theoretical issue, given
that none of the three courts struck down the kosher laws based on this particular ground. More worrisome
is the doctrinal entanglement argument described at length below.
C.
Doctrinal Entanglement
The strongest challenge to the kosher food laws coming from the New Jersey Supreme Court centered
around the issue of doctrinal entanglement.85 Under the famous Lemon rule, a particular statute must
not encourage \an excessive government entanglement with religion."86 The Court argued that the kosher
laws \inextricably intertwined Jewish Law prescribing religious ritual and practice with the secular law of
the state." This intertwining of secular and religious law was inevitable because the kosher statue imposed
religious standards, and then went on to authorize the State to verify compliance with these religious-based
standards. Responding in advance to a possible response that the kosher standards could be recast in secular
terms, the Court argued that the regulations were troublesome because they attempted to monitor not the
\nutritional quality or sanitary purity of kosher food, but only its religious purity."87 Finally, the Court
argued that the religious determination of \kosher" was open to dispute; the inevitable application and
84Kristin Morgan, casenote, The Constitutionality of New Jersey Kosher Food Regulations Under the Establishment Clause,
62 University of Cincinnati Law Review, 247, 263 (1993).
85Karen Ruth Lindsay, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon Test?: The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed
Statues, 23 University of Dayton Law Review 337, 356 (1998).
86Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971).
87Ran-Dav, 608 A.2d at 1363.
23interpretation of Jewish law would be problematic as the State could not lend its power to a particular side
of a religious argument. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the regulation violated the Establishment
Clause under a Lemon entanglement test.88
Each of the objections mentioned above will be dealt with in turn. The most troublesome of these can be
stated plainly as follows: Because every accusation of kosher fraud requires the government to prove that the
vendor's representation was false, i.e. not kosher, the government would inevitably have to turn to religious
sources to prove its case. A simplistic analysis of \separation of church and state" would seem to argue
against this partnership, but case law seems to have carved out an area where this type of inquiry by a
secular, government court can be made.89
In Jones v. Wolf, the \neutral principles" approach was established by the Supreme Court, guiding civil
courts in how to properly construe church documents. The basic holding was to scrutinize a document in
secular terms, while abstaining from interpreting provisions that inherently involved \religious concepts."90
Harvard University's John Manseld expands on this point by making a distinction between inherently
religious terms, such as being \saved" or \holy water"|which rely on a \reference beyond human experience
to an extrahuman source of value"|and facts that are \of this world", such as whether or not particular
water in question in fact comes from the Dead Sea, or if an artifact is composed of wood or stone.91 The
neutral principles approach thus advocates a two-step approach: rst is to comb through a particular religious
document and make a clear distinction between inherently religious language and language that is \of this
world"; second is to interpret the latter, and to simply punt on the former.92
88Sullivan, supra note 70, at 209.
89Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 955.
90Id. at 958.
91Id.
92Id. at 964.
24Just as courts have used the neutral principles approach helpful in the context of church documents
crafted with secular language, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that civil courts can likewise read kosher
fraud laws, whose wording can be likewise be characterized as largely secular in tone. Kosher rules for
the most part deal with things that are \objectively ascertainable", such as whether or not the meat has
been soaked and salted for the proper length of time, whether or not milk and meat have mixed, how
an animal is slaughtered, and the like.93 To make the distinction clear, an example of a kosher rule that
uses inherently religious concepts is one that holds a particular piece of meat to be non-kosher because the
slaughterer is \impious".94 In such a case, a civil court could not resolve such an issue, but it would be free
to examine other process-related facts, such as whether or not this \impious slaughterer" severed the trachea
in one knife-stroke. Thus, the neutral principles approach seems to give courts a way to deal with regulations
whose impulse and wording are religious, but whose interpretation can be done in a straightforwardly secular
manner.
One of the assumptions in the approach advocated above is that the religious standard that courts are
applying are unanimously agreed to. What happens if there is a genuine religious dierence of opinion as to
whether a particular factor aects a product's status as kosher? One example is that of the prayer said before
slaughtering an animal: one school of thought holds that saying the prayer is an absolute prerequisite for
kosher, another says that its preferable, but an omission does not aect the kosher status.95 In such a case,
a civil court is not permitted by any of the authorities discussed above to resolve this dispute. Rather, it
would have to simply pass on the question, and could not prosecute a particular merchant for violating what
turns out to be something that Judaism's religious scholars themselves have active disagreements about.96
936 Encyclopedia Judaica 31 (1972).
94Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 943.
95Issac Klein, A Guide to Jewish Practice 215 (1979).
96Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 949.
25Given that there are a number of areas where the meaning of kosher is disputed within Jewish religious
circles, the question for us is how signicant this lack of unanimity has to be in order to judge the rule
unconstitutional.97 A dissent in the Ran-Dav decision, Justice Stein, argued that, \A statue or regulation
is facially unconstitutional only if the guiding constitution is necessarily violated every time the law is
enforced."98 In other words, if there is unanimous consensus about what kosher means with respect to a
majority of factors|even if this falls short of unanimity on all factors|then there is an argument that the
statute should survive. This then becomes an empirical investigation. While the anti-statute courts seemed
eager to use a handful of graphic examples that showed dierences of opinion, all reliable sources acquainted
with even the most basic knowledge of Judaism point to the fact that on the vast majority of questions of
kosher standards, there is agreement among Jews.99 One common way of expressing this has been to plot all
possible kosher issues on a line from a-z. Factoring for both dierences of opinion with the Orthodox Jewish
community as well as other Jewish denominations, the range of consensus can be thought to lie somewhere
along a-v.100
This ex ante investigation is bolstered by data that can mined from a study of kosher food regulation in New
York. First, the study found that in situations where there were rabbinical disagreements over whether or not
something was kosher, \neither the Department of Markets nor the Kosher Law Enforcement Bureau were
likely to bring the issue to court."101 Second, in the case of Brach's Meat Market, Inc. v. Abrams, the court
dismissed the case altogether when the testimony of two rabbis conicted with respect to whether deveining
97Mark Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher, 26 Columbia Journal of Law
and Social Problems, 1, 17 (1992).
98Ran-Dav, 608 A.2d at 1358.
99Alan Unterman, Jews: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices 184 (1981).
100Id. at 189.
101Slonim, supra note 57, 394.
26tongues was necessary for kosher.102 Third, the best articulation of this \neutral approach" was expressed
in Korn v. Rabbinical Council: \Jurisdiction will be proper if, after the application of traditional Judaic law
to the facts surrounding the preparation of the specic food in question, Jewish religious authorities do not
dispute the characterization of the food as kosher."103
The upshot of the foregoing is that the anti-statute courts were hasty and simplistic in their dealing with
the entanglement issue. Case law, via the \neutral" approach, has carved out a well-established space where
civil courts could refer to religious standards under certain conditions, but the anti-statute courts preferred
to ignore this. Instead, they appealed to hypothetical examples and simply dismissed the realities of kosher
laws.
D.
Vesting Entanglement
Another potential area of Establishment Clause concern deals with the manner in which governments enforce
the kosher fraud laws. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., the Court held that the Establishment Clause disal-
lows the state from delegating \discretionary governmental powers to religious institutions".104 Questionable
enforcement activity can range from New Jersey's \State Kosher Advisory Committee"|a formalized con-
sultation between state and a religious body|all the way down to a \mere standard" that inevitably requires
the active participation of individuals of a particular faith for its interpretation and enforcement. What is
the extent of permissible involvement, beyond which we run into genuine Establishment Clause concerns?
102Meacham, supra note 80, 645.
103Unterman, supra note 99, 188.
104Morgan, supra note 84, at 255.
27First, it seems reasonable that no entanglement concerns are present when informal consultations occur
between the state and a religious body. The New Jersey group mentioned above|whose every appointee
was a rabbi|may be more problematic. However, even in its situation, if the rabbis are merely advisors, and
no government power inheres in them, it is not obvious that there is much of a threat.105 This is dierent
from, for example, the Larkin case, in which the government handed over to churches complete discretionary
power to veto liquor licenses in a particular neighborhood. The New Jersey group|by virtue of the fact
that it was given very limited real power|functioned more like the \Neighborhood Watch for kosher food"
than a substitute for a powerful branch of the civil government.106
Second, something should be said about the necessary prerequisites for individuals wishing to be involved
in this eort to curb kosher fraud. Because the laws of kosher are accessible to most people of average
intelligence, this accessibility lends itself to the possibility that the kosher enforcers making up these boards,
etc., are not required to be rabbis, or even Jewish.107 As one commentator put it explicitly, \The job of
kosher inspector and law enforcers requires a strong knowledge of the laws of kashrut, not a religious belief
in their origin."108 Thus, though states with kosher fraud statutes typically have appointed rabbis to sit on
these groups, there is nothing that compels future selection to be limited to members of the Jewish faith.109
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that though the presence of rabbis on a government board has the appearance
of impropriety, observing a few simple safeguards is likely to be enough to keep Establishment Clause concerns
from spoiling the day. The most critical point is that no real, discretionary power be given over to a group
composed of religious ocials. Advisory committees, quasi-neighborhood watch groups, and other such
105Lindsay, supra note 85, at 343.
106Id. at 344.
107Sullivan, supra note 70, at 211.
108Klein, supra note 95, at 219.
109Meacham, supra note 80, at 649.
28collectives that do not limit their membership to only rabbis should all be considered acceptable.
E.
Eects analysis
The nal area of Establishment Clause concern is that of eects. The basic tests that have been established,
known as the Lemon tests, make unconstitutional a particular piece of legislation that strongly benets or
endorses religion.110 This \eect" is usually measured and observed under three dierent theoretical lenses:
the endorsement test, the primary eects test, and the coercion test.111 Each of these will be explained
briey, and then discussed in light of the kosher fraud laws.
The rst test is the endorsement test, which seems to have captured the heart of both the Supreme Court and
lower courts.112 Stated at its most basic level, the test argues that \endorsement of religion sends a message
to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."113 Anything
that sends such a message of endorsement is thus judged to be unconstitutional. One area that kosher laws
have been accused of falling into endorsement problems is through the use of \Orthodox Hebrew" standards
in statutes' denition of kosher, bringing charges that this eectively codies Jewish law. A second area,
one that the New Jersey Court found problematic|in that it created a symbolic union between church and
state|was the use of religious personnel.114
The best response to these accusations begins by noting that the Supreme Court has made clear the need
110Lindsay, supra note 85, at 345.
111Id. at 348.
112Id.
113Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610.
114Lindsay, supra note 85, at 348.
29to evaluate each \government practice...in its unique circumstances". In other words, a theoretical, hy-
pothetical determination is not enough; an on-the-grounds, contextual, case-by-case analysis is called for.
The Barghout court attempted to use public-display-of-symbols reasoning to the kosher fraud laws, arguing
that their codication in a separate section of the City Code rather than included as part of the general
ordinances that deal with fraud and misrepresentation signaled that the kosher issue was of special signi-
cance.115 However, it is enough to note that the only person likely to be aware of this subtlety is an attorney
or highly-trained legal sta member, the very type of person who would not be likely to make a \lay mistake"
and draw wild conclusions from a simple legal categorization.
Secondly, as a way to eradicate any ambiguity, a public-notice articulation of these kosher fraud laws or
notices of their violation, etc., can carry with them a disclaimer to the eect that \these laws do not endorse
any particular religious doctrine; their primary intention is to protect consumers."116 This sentiment can
be communicated both in public-notice environments as well as on ocial government inspection forms; the
rst communicates to the lay public, while the latter makes the same point to those involved in the food
industry. The nal point is a practical one. Given Judaism's minority status and relatively low \conversion
rate" among non-Jews, it is highly unlikely that a kosher fraud law would send strong signals of endorsement
or the like. Unless these fraud laws were coupled with other laws that were perceived to give Jews special
protection, as they stand by themselves these laws do not appear to give the impression of endorsement.
A second test concerned with the constitutionality of the eects of kosher fraud legislation is the primary eect
test, which demands that a law's \principal or primary eect...neither advance...nor inhibit...religion."117
One obvious benet of the kosher laws is that religious consumers are better able to abide by their religious
requirements. However, it is entirely reasonable to argue that this benet is only secondary, and rides on
top of the logically precedent benet of limiting fraud. While it does have the eect of beneting religious
115Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1339.
116Berman, supra note 97, at 20.
117Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
30Jews, it should be noted that it is individuals that are beneting rather than institutions, i.e. synagogues
and the like. This is relevant to the extent that typical Establishment Clause cases dealing with this point
usually involve money or services going directly to religious institutions.118 Furthermore, a mere reference
to religion does not automatically make a statute's main eect a religious one. As long as the religious
denition of kosher serves a secular purpose|in this case protecting against consumer fraud|then one can
still reasonably conclude that the main eect is a secular one, rather than the constitutionally impermissible
one of advancing religion.119 A related example can be found in the case of County of Allegheny v. ACU
Greater Pittsburgh Area, where the Court ruled that a menorah displayed in public during Hanukkah did not
violate the Establishment Clause, because it is a symbol with both religious and secular dimensions. This
argument about the hybrid nature of kosher fraud laws is equally persuasive.120
A second factor in primary eect analysis asks how broad the beneted class is. A number of industry reports
claim that only 25% of kosher consumers are Jewish; the 75% majority are made up of individuals of other
religious faiths with similar dietary standards, those who eat kosher for health reasons, those who believe
that kosher is nutritionally/hygienically superior, and those who simply buy kosher without being entirely
aware that they are doing so.121 This empirical fact is absolutely crucial in determining the eects of the
kosher laws. Those who argue that government should stay out of this area and let the Jewish community
police on its own have little to respond with here. Even if Jewish communities did their own monitoring,
what about the 75% of kosher consumers who are not Jews? This empirical data demonstrates quite vividly
that the benet extends far beyond Jews interested in abiding by their religious requirements, and that
the vast majority of these fraud laws' beneciaries are non-Jews whose interest in kosher is non-religious.
This argument becomes particularly powerful when considering the fact that the direct/indirect benet test
118Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 951.
119Id.
120Morgan, supra note 84, at 253.
121Consumer Alert 68, Kashrus Magazine, February 1996, at 16.
31alluded to earlier has fallen out of favor with courts employing the primary eects test.122 Because the
breadth analysis is increasingly becoming the analytical weapon of choice for courts, and because the kosher
fraud laws pass the breadth analysis with ying colors, it is reasonable to conclude that there is not much
of a constitutionality issue here.
The third and nal test concerned with the constitutionality of the eects of kosher fraud legislation is
the coercion test, which argues that, \government involvement in religion that has the eect of coercing or
appearing to coerce agreement or association with beliefs one does not share is an aront to personal dignity
and to liberty".123 The constitutionality of any statute found to have this eect is suspect. Although the
New Jersey Court alluded to the kosher law having some coercive avor, no one has launched a serious chal-
lenge to the laws on these grounds.124 Ultimately, the fact remains that any vendor who feels `coerced' by
having to abide by particular standards is doing so of his own choosing; the decision to sell kosher products
is an unpressured decision, and one whose conditions a vendor is imposing on himself.
F.
Conclusions on the Constitutionality Debate
The upshot of the above is that the jury is still out on whether or not the present kosher fraud legal regime
passes constitutional muster, especially with respect to issues of Establishment Clause analysis. What is
important to note is that the seminal decision by the New Jersey Court was a close 4-3 split, and that many
of the issues used as a basis for the decision were themselves closely decided.125 Having explored several of
these close issues at a fairly detailed level, it is fair to conclude that it is not at all clear that similar state
122Lindsay, supra note 85, at 347.
123Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618.
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125Id. at 2362.
32fraud laws will soon be condemned to the legal scrapyard. At best, as legal observers, we can note that with
three state laws recently being overturned because of similar constitutional concerns, there seems to be a
momentum|no matter how tenuous |in favor of abandoning these decade-old laws in favor of something
less overtly religious.126 The New Jersey model seems to be the blueprint of the future, so it may behoove
us to say a few words about this before concluding the discussion about the New York-style fraud laws by
contextualizing our ndings above in a halal context.
The New Jersey-style Statutes
New Jersey's kosher fraud statutes part from the New York-model in a number of ways. Here, a vendor of
kosher food goes to a private, third-party group and attempts to win their endorsement.127 If the vendor
passes their certication standards, he becomes entitled to use their mark on his products. If a vendor's
use of an organization's mark is legitimate, there are no legal problems to resolve. However, if the vendor's
use of the mark is false, the certifying organization can enforce its rights to the mark under trademark
and/or contract theory; additionally, the State can prosecute such a manufacturer/vendor for falsely using a
certifying mark under theories of fraud.128 Eectively, this law functions as a sunshine law, in that disclosure
of one's claims to kosher is the single most important aspect of abiding by the law. This is quite dierent
from the New York laws. First, all references to Orthodox standards are removed. Instead, the laws are
\basis-based", in that they demand of vendors and manufacturers of kosher products to inform consumers
of the basis for their kosher label use.129 Second, the state's need for rabbis becomes obsolete. Third, the
126Id.
127Slonim, supra note 57, 395.
128Id. at 396.
129Lindsay, supra note 85, at 349.
33New Jersey statute is part of a larger scheme of consumer protection, and is located in a section of the legal
code that reects this rather than sitting as a stand-alone kosher fraud law.130
The chief advantage of the New Jersey law is that it captures many, if not all, of the New York-style
law's advantages without running into the same damning questions of constitutionality.131 Specically,
entanglement is no longer an issue. In the New Jersey laws, there is no determination of what kosher is; this
is left to the private certifying organizations to decide, and any symbolic link between Orthodox Judaism
and the State is done away with.132 Further, there is no longer a need for state employees to make religious
decisions; rabbis with religious expertise are simply not needed because the important standard under this
alternate scheme is whether a vendor is doing what the mark he has voluntarily worn claims he is doing. The
only two steps necessary here|rather than a complicated kosher analysis that dives into religious standards
and the like|are to determine if a certifying mark is being used, and to then determine whether the use of
the mark is valid.133 This is much like a government scheme that penalizes people in the medical profession
for practicing without a license.
A second constitutional challenge that this type of statute overcomes is that of eects. Because references
to religious standards have been removed, the law looks and feels like a purely secular one. As such, any idea
that this New Jersey-style law promotes Judaism becomes untenable. Consumer protection becomes the
emphasized goal of the law, and specically Jewish consumer protection is de-emphasized.134 The primary
eect of the law is plain disclosure and reliable labeling, rather than helping Jewish practitioners achieve their
goals of abiding by the laws of kosher. Furthermore, the fact that the New Jersey law is contextualized in
a larger scheme of fraud in advertising/sale of merchandise emphasizes this point. This contextualization|
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34rather than sitting alone|underscores this point about applicability beyond just the Jewish community.135
The appeal to legislatures of the New Jersey-style law should be emphasized. The possibility of passing a
law that protects the integrity of kosher food and that simultaneously avoids the constitutionality issues is
the chief draw.136 When the Maryland Senate was considering adopting a New Jersey-style law, David Conn
wrote in the Baltimore Jewish Times, \A Senate committee last week unanimously approved legislation
to rewrite Maryland's kosher products law, only seconds after hearing testimony on the bill. Usually, a
committee will take days or weeks to vote on a bill after its hearing."137 Further, the fact that at least
three states have replaced their New York-style laws with New Jersey-style ones seem to indicate that the
rationale for abandoning decades-old legislation is linked to the availability of an alternative.138
The Constitutionality Issues and Halal
Having duly noted that the New Jersey regime seems to be on the ascent, it would be appropriate to bring
closure to the discussion of New York-style law by making a few comments about how the constitutional-
ity issues bear on a developing halal regime. One of the fundamental questions|if not the fundamental
question|facing proponents of halal fraud statutes is which of the two existing models should be used as a
template: New York's or New Jersey's? For reasons that are strategic, practical, and philosophical, it seems
more advantageous to aggressively pursue the latter at the expense of the former.
First, it is useful to recall the three recent court decisions that declared New York style statutes unconstitu-
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35tional. Though a great deal of the analysis of the above suggested that courts may have been too hasty, that
the decisions were themselves too close to call, and that certain philosophical trends in individual judges
were responsible for the outcome, the fact at the end of the day is that the courts' hammer came out against
kosher fraud laws.139 Had this phenomena been isolated to New Jersey and/or Baltimore, one could have
argued persuasively that the continuation of the California and New York regimes would serve as a bulwark
against further intrusions into the present regime.
However, the legal coup that occurred in New York|the home state of the country's rst kosher fraud
statute|suggests in both a symbolic and concrete fashion that it may be a matter of time before the New
York-style laws are discarded in favor of the less-problematic New Jersey ones.140 It is the conviction of the
present writer that had New Jersey not developed an alternative, the New York-style laws would continue
to stand|constitutional problems or not.141 The reason for this turn against New York-style laws is that
a far less problematic, more sensible, less restrictive approach seems to be available. It is only through the
availability of such a substitute that courts are coming to feel comfortable with abandoning the decade-old
laws.142 Again, the upshot here for halal lawmakers is that it does not make much sense to devote time
and energy lobbying for a type of protection that is getting struck down in a similar kosher context. The
argument here is purely strategic, and encourages halal lawmakers to not go along with a dying trend (New
York statute) and instead pursue a rising trend (New Jersey statute).
Second, even if the halal regime could pursue the New York-style statute without strategic or administrative
costs, there does not seem to be any compelling reasons for it to do so. Not much is gained from the New
York-style statutes; from our exploration above it certainly does not seem that they add much above and
beyond those of New Jersey, other than some symbolic value in language.143 It seems that the only reason
139Lindsay, supra note 85, at 354.
140Id.
141Id. at 358.
142Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 955.
143Id. at 949.
36that friends of the New York-style statute are mourning its death is because of inertia|they have been
on the books for decades|rather than for any specic substantive reasons. The fact that the halal regime
has never had a New York-style statute in place makes this \emotionally" less taxing, in that there is a
sense of building towards New Jersey rather than tearing down New York. Because the New Jersey law
was suggested by the New Jersey court in the same breath as its old New York-style law was being struck
down, and crafted by lawmakers who wanted to preserve the advantages of kosher protection without the
constitutional problems, it has the perceived eect among judges of throwing out the proverbial water, while
keeping the baby.
Third, there is some aesthetic/symbolic value in aggressively pursuing the New Jersey model. It is tting
that the rst state to strike down the old kosher model was the same state to adopt the country's rst
halal fraud laws. In a sense, both regimes|one dying, one rising|are on the cutting edge.144 There is a
sense of \baton passing" in the manner these things transpired on the legislative scene. Rather than halal
lawmakers try to begin from point zero and build towards a coherent halal regime, they were able to pick
up at the precise point where the kosher regime left o. Much of the literature|especially the law review
articles|that discuss the developments in the kosher regime reference halal similarities and the needs of
Muslim consumers.145 Now that the two systems are getting similar legal attention, there may be exponen-
tial value in promoting their development along similar lines. In other words, if both regimes aggressively
pursue the New Jersey-style statutes, best/worst practices learned in the context of halal can be applied to
a kosher setting, and vice versa. This \sibling" approach to legal development seems a logical step to take,
given the striking similarities between the two systems.
Fourth, aside from the strategic and philosophical reasons pointed out above, logistical and administrative
reasons seem to compel halal lawmakers with moving forward with the New Jersey-style laws. Put as simply
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37as possible, because New Jersey was the rst halal fraud law to be passed, institutional momentum is on
the side of the New Jersey-style laws. Group behavior theorists argue that templates of success and failure
are easily repeated. In this case, the same organization that headed the eort in New Jersey is likely to
help coordinate eorts in other states. This theory was borne out in fact. The American Muslim Council
(AMC), the non-prot group largely responsible for the New Jersey statute, worked through its local oces
in Minnesota to achieve a similar halal fraud law there.146 In interviews with AMC's halal correspondent,
it is clear that they are intending to replicate this success story everywhere they happen to have a state
chapter.147 Even in areas where no state chapter exists, they have made it clear that they are available to
work with other local non-prots and lawmakers to set up similar statutes.148 Obviously, each time that
AMC is helpful in getting one of these New Jersey-style laws passed, the more it will be entrenched|not that
entrenchment is necessarily negative|in its New Jersey-style strategy. All of its key learnings, data points,
and legislative familiarity will tilt lopsidedly with the New Jersey-style statutes, making a New York-style
strategy more unlikely with each passing success story.
The nal reasons to pursue exclusively New Jersey-style statutes are psychological. Muslims in America
exist as a minority group. The modus operandi of minority groups in America, historically, has been to aim
for small victories|legislative, media-oriented, and the like|and to use these as building blocks for larger
victories. Here, the package is too tempting to pass up. Three state-level laws were passed, largely by the
eorts of an underfunded, undermanned nonprot group operating in an at-the-seat-of-its-pants manner.149
Momentum is in place for more, and legislative bodies seem almost anxious to reward both kosher and
halal lawmakers with New Jersey-style laws in exchange for forgoing the New York-style strategy.150 In this
environment, it makes perfect sense for Muslims, as a minority group, to accumulate these successes|and
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38in the process learn more of the nuts and bolts about the legislative process. What does not make any
sense whatsoever is why halal proponents would be so cavalier to turn away from these all-but-guaranteed
statute adoptions, and instead pursue a New York-style strategy that is being summarily torn down against
a group|Jewish consumers in America|that has far more legal clout.151
Another psychological reason for New Jersey-style laws is one of perspective. Because New Jersey and
Minnesota were the rst halal statutes to be passed, there is a sense that these are the \norm" and standard.
The same cannot be said about the kosher laws, where the New Jersey statute is seen to carry|as a matter of
perception|less protection than the decades-old New York laws.152 Given our discussion of the substantive
similarities between the two templates, it is fair to conclude that this dierence in perception is rooted
more in psychology than in substantive reality. For Jewish lawmakers, New Jersey is seen as a step-down;
theoretically, had they been oered the New Jersey statute back in 1933 instead of the New York-style one,
chances are they would have been quite pleased.153 However, because of this step-down perception, there is
a mild bitterness associated with the trend towards overthrowing the New York regime. Halal lawmakers do
not have similar baggage: New Jersey and Minnesota dened the limits and set the standard. Any future
statute in other states that is based on these will be judged a success.
The upshot of the forgoing analysis is that it is eminently sensible for halal lawmakers to pursue an exclusively
New Jersey-style strategy. Though there would be some minimal aesthetic value for one minority group to get
what another minority group has enjoyed for decades|i.e. Muslims getting a New York-style law|resources
are better spent in the path of achieving real victories rather than historically symbolic ones. There are little
if no substantive dierences between the New Jersey and New York regimes, and the momentum in favor of
151Id. at 25.
152Regenstein, supra note 133, at 215.
153Slonim, supra note 5, at 396.
39the former seems quite strong. Moreover, the halal regime is young in America, and meeting the protection
needs of halal consumers can be accomplished with a New Jersey-style law; anything pursued beyond this is
a misdirected eort likely to be met with little returns on time and energy spent.
PART IV { An Emerging Model for Halal Statutes
Having determined that the New Jersey basis-based system seems the better of two approaches for both the
kosher and halal regimes, we are now required to more fully explore in some detail the promises and perils
of such a basis-based system for halal laws. First, we will briey examine how basis-based systems have
performed in New Jersey over the past two years. Second, we will explore the likely dierences between
kosher and halal basis-based approaches, and ask what challenges might be posed to the latter. Finally,
we will discuss alternative approaches that address some of the problems presented by a pure basis-based
system.
The Kosher Experience in New Jersey
The last ocial count put the number of registered kosher symbols currently in use in the United States at
200.154 Each symbol represents a unique certifying group, many with diering standards on what is required
to earn certication. As discussed earlier in the paper, dierent sects of Judaism have diering notions of
what kosher is; some of these kosher symbols inform that the food item in question is acceptable by, for exam-
ple, Reform standards but not Orthodox, or Reconstructionist but not Reform. 155 Some of these certifying
groups go further than just making a claim about the food itself. For example, some certiers do not give
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40their nod of approval to vendors who fail to observe the Sabbath.156 Another certier|the highly inuential
OU|changed content in Bazooka Gum's accompanying comic strip because some of the content reected
\ideas that are not in keeping with Judaism."157 Because the relationship between vendor/manufacturer
of kosher food and these certifying organizations does not have government-as-middle-man, virtually any
standards can be set by the certifying organizations|even blatantly religious ones such as the Sabbath
observance requirement|because the relationship is governed by private contract law. In short, each orga-
nization is free to set its own standards based on the particular demographic it aims to serve.
The foundation of this certication scheme is based on trust and knowledge of members of the community.
Endorsement by other like|minded organizations is usually a rst-step in getting consumer trust. A certi-
fying brand that is endorsed by a number of Jewish publications, prominent individuals, etc., is more likely
to enjoy wide currency and trust than a local brand who few people know much about. Over the years,
various groups of Jews have come to learn quite intimately the dierent standards of dierent groups. For
example, Orthodox Jews generally stay away from candies that are imported from Israel because of the
latter's general acceptance of gelatin use.158 Ashkenasic Jews|out of concern over legumes and rice|will
skip on buying Sephardic-supervised food for Passover.159 This type of knowledge is relatively free-owing
and widely disseminated in the Jewish community. Tight-knit groups will often be informed by their local
rabbis and other members of their congregation. For those with slightly looser connections to a local Jewish
community, magazines such as Kashrus|which is published ve times a year and informs Jewish consumers
about mislabeled products, the supervision industry, and unauthorized use of kosher symbols|disseminate
much-needed and helpful information.160 While these information networks help Jewish consumers stay
abreast of much-needed information about kosher, they do not do much to help non-Jewish individuals who
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41either by denition are not part of the religious community or who do not subscribe to such specialized
magazines.
Putting this asymmetry to the side for a moment, it is worthwhile to note that while private certiers
make up the bulk of this New Jersey-style system, public law does play a critical role, particularly in the
context of enforcement. Contract law is the very linchpin of the relationship between vendor and certier,
while organizations guard against brand-dilution through trademark law.161 Moreover, the New Jersey law
requires that vendors disclose \the basis upon which the representation is made", i.e. the representation
that a product is kosher.162 Others have suggested a whole host of modications to this basic public-private
scheme, including a federally-dened minimum kosher standard and a requirement that certiers register
with the state. Eectively, this public-private hybrid combines the best of both worlds: it allows the market,
via quick and nimble private certiers, to cater to a large number of dierent demographic groups within
the Jewish community; at the same time, it gives these private individuals the protection and legitimacy of
public law in order to enforce these rights and trust-based relationships.163
Applying Best Practices in a Halal Regime
How much of this so-far successful model can be replicated in the context of halal regime? At rst glance,
based on the many similarities between halal and kosher, it seems as though the answer would be quite a bit:
there are dierent schools of thought; there is a fair amount of internal communication within the Muslim
community in the United States; a number of groups seem poised to enter the certication world. However,
a more in-depth look reveals some sharp dierences with the kosher regime.164 Whether these dierences
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42are great enough to make the public-private hybrid model that works so well for kosher untenable in a halal
context is something that is open to exploration. One of the main issues concerns the make-up of the Muslim
community in America, and whether this group constitutes a large enough, well-dened market that can
command quality halal products. A second issue deals with the sophistication and professionalism of the
existing certiers. Finally, a short case study of Al-Safa|the leading certier for halal products in North
America|should throw into sharp relief some of these practical diculties.
Dynamics of the Muslim Community in America
One of the most important things to note about the Muslim community in America is the absence of author-
ity. Recall in the early parts of this paper the discussion about diering schools of thought in Islam. Though
the vast majority of Muslims have historically followed one of the four classical schools of jurisprudence, the
20th century has witnessed whole populations of Muslims discarding their aliation to a particular school
of thought.165 The reasons are complex, and have as much to do with intellectual trends in the West as
they do with historical trends in the East. The end result is that American Muslims for the most part do
not derive their knowledge about Islamic law from one of the four schools of thought. Rather, individuals
will, for the most part, assign to themselves the task of interpreting passages from sacred texts, ask local
scholars, and generally \go with" ideas that seem to enjoy consensus-of-the-moment.166
This hard-to-pin-down approach makes certication a tricky matter. In the kosher context, there are fairly
well-dened understandings of kosher. Within the Muslim context, this denition tends to be more conser-
vative than need be, because the tendency tilts towards scrupulousness rather than permissiveness. As was
pointed out earlier, almost all discussions around gelatin conclude that gelatin is impermissible, despite the
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43fact that the Hana school of thought declares it to be absolutely permissible.167 A conscientious Muslim,
noting that most medicine gelcaps contain gelatin, may deny herself much-needed relief out of sheer igno-
rance that the product is permitted according to one of the great schools. A respect for these four schools
of thought, and an awareness of their dierent standards of halal, would allow at least one group that cer-
ties according to Hana methodology to make this product acceptable to Muslims. This is an example of
the claim that the more Muslims learn about the classical, rigorous schools of thought, the more products
previously o-limits will become acceptable for use.168
The opposite extreme caused by this lack of school-of-thought aliation is a devil-may-care attitude towards
halal in general. It is well-established that many|if not most|Jews do not observe kosher.169 This same
problem of lackluster adherence is more pronounced among Muslims in America. The lack of authority has
led to a proliferation of historically-untenable positions concerning halal, including the most blatant example
of many religious gures giving \ocial" religious opinions that eating unslaughtered meat is acceptable.170
This sort of trend emphasizes that because Muslims are living as a minority in America, \pragmatism"
should the rule the day; consequently, much is accepted that historically has been o-limits. Because of
this, Muslim consumers that would otherwise have demanded a halal industry to spring up in America are
instead complacent, believing that unslaughtered meat and the like are acceptable. An industry made up of
certiers and vendors can only grow around a strong market need. Without an active campaign educating
American Muslims of the absolute religious need for a halal regime, a healthy privately-driven industry will
be hard pressed to come into being.
Problems With the Halal Certiers
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44A second set of problems with the New Jersey private-public hybrid applied in a halal context concerns the
certiers themselves. First is the problem of qualication. A peek at a kosher certifying group reveals a
well-oiled machine with a great deal of expertise and specialization.171 Halal certifying groups such as Islamic
Food and Nutrition Counsel of America (IFANCA), however, run a distant second.172 The senior ocers
have backgrounds that do not necessarily relate to the food industry, and their command of authoritative
religious knowledge of Islam is nowhere equivalent to that of a rabbi's knowledge of Judaism. Moreover,
there is a pervasive perception given o that the organization is constantly underfunded and undermanned.
A look at IFANCA's website further gives the impression of less-than-total professionalism, while a phone
call conrms some of these impressions.173
A second problem with the certiers centers around the issue of transparency. Because the Jewish community
has managed to hold on to at least some consensus idea of kosher, and because many groups compete
for market share, these various certifying groups go to great lengths to describe in painful detail their
methodology, approach, and denition of kosher. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about the current
crop of halal certiers.174 A quest to nd detailed, rigorous methodology for what these groups mean
by \halal" was fruitless.175 Most seemed to oscillate between the \most restrictive" and \devil-may-care"
denitions of halal. Any reference to the notion of legitimate, mutually-recognized and respected dierences
of opinion were regularly lacking.176 A product declared not in keeping with halal standards was often
not accompanied by an explanation describing why it failed to earn certication. Any notion of process-
based criteria|i.e. similar to the kosher standards of kosher equipment not interacting with non-kosher
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45equipment/utensils|was totally and completely absent from any of these certifying groups.177 Overall, this
reductive, black-box approach to dening and certifying products as halal|needless to say|is less than
satisfactory for consumers who are willing to pay a premium for something that is authentically halal.
Problems Inherent in the Industry
A third problem with the certiers has to do with the nancial logic of certication industries as a whole.
Running a certifying body by denition entails mid-to-high start-up costs.178 Because the only way to
generate revenue is via certication, some certifying groups may lower their standards in order to get a
foothold in the industry.179 In the context of the kosher industry, this is not a likely problem. There are
a few brand-leading certifying organizations, and any newcomers need to compete against this established
background of trust. Vendors have an obvious incentive to get the endorsement of a well-trusted, well-known
group, and they are willing to pay a premium for a premium endorsement. In the context of halal, however,
because there is no clear brand leader, and because of the lack of transparency issues pointed out above,
there is virtually no incentive for a vendor to go to a rigorous but mid-priced certier as opposed to a
low-standard, re-sale-prices certier. There have been anecdotal cases where one certier was undercut by
another certier on nothing other than price: the latter lured the vendor away from the former by promising
bargain-priced certication.180 According to those involved in this particular scenario, the standards of the
less-expensive certifying group were|not coincidentally|less rigorous.
A third and nal concern returns us to the characteristics of the market for halal. Assuming for the moment
that all of the problems above were somehow to be xed, where would things stand? In a largely privately-run
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46certication scheme for Jews, non-Jews simply do not have the same access to the all-important information
network. The same problem applies in the halal context. Non-Muslim consumers of halal would likely be
locked out of the information networks based out of mosques and specialty-interest newsletters. Moreover,
it should go without saying that a not insignicant number of Muslims are likewise|for one reason or
another|out of this information loop.181 Relying on a totally private-run certication system that relies on
a well-versed, knowledgeable community of consumers is one thing; doing the former without the latter is a
recipe for failure.
The Al-Safa Case Dilemma
At this point, there may be tremendous value in illustrating many of the preceding points with a case-study
of one of the most controversial developments in the young history of halal in America. The saga began when
the government of Malaysia approached the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Canada|a highly
respected national organization|to certify halal meat products that would be imported into Malaysia.182
ISNA in turn approached several local beef producers. After extensive discussions with one company in
particular|MGI Packers Inc.|and after MGI agreed to abide by the halal standards set by ISNA, the
latter agreed to grant MGI halal certication.183 As MGI become acclimated to the halal beef market,
it saw a tremendous opportunity in the area of producing and distributing halal chicken. A subsidiary
called Al-Safa (in Arabic, \The Pure") was formed specically for this task. Because of the already-existing
relationship with MGI, ISNA proceeded on good faith with Al-Safa.184
At the beginning of 1999, the relationship between ISNA and Al-Safa hit a snag. According to ISNA, Al-Safa
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47was stalling in tying up outstanding contractual details.185 At about the same time, ISNA's suspicions about
Al-Safa grew as a result of inconsistent answers to questions sent to Al-Safa and its suppliers. Numerous
attempts were made to resolve the existing dierences, but the relationship ended with ISNA refusing to
certify Al-Safa because of doubts as to its ability to conform to its halal standards.186 Al-Safa responded
with press releases of its own, claiming that the revocation had nothing to do with substance and everything
to do with politics.187 A short time later, Al-Safa won certication from another competing certier|
IFANCA|previously mentioned in this piece.188
While this short history reveals nothing more than that Al-Safa's journey to certication was somewhat
bumpy, the real story is found in how Al-Safa became the leading producer of halal products in North
America. The most surprising fact to note is that Al-Safa is a 100% non-Muslim owned business.189 Recall the
description from the earlier part of this paper of the halal industry in America as a fragmented, heterogeneous
community with no single, dominant player. Henry and David Muller|two individuals of non-Muslim faith|
were already involved in the meat packing industry when they realized the tremendous market opportunity
that the halal industry represented.190 To throw their hat into the ring, they formed Al-Safa, and pursued an
aggressive customer-oriented marketing strategy. Among the tactics involved were getting a Muslim name
and Arabic logo with a mosque picture, hiring just a handful of visible Muslim employees, and operating a
voice mail message that began with the traditional Muslim greeting of peace in Arabic and English.191 By
any outside observer's best guess, this was a Muslim company from top to bottom.192
It did not take much time for Al-Safa's well-honed marketing and distribution practices to pay-o, vaulting
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48into the single biggest player in the young halal industry.193 With increased exposure came increased
scrutiny, and it soon became the \talk of the town" that this company|by all appearances a Muslim owned
and operated venture|was not even partially owned by any Muslim businessmen.194 What caused the
greatest uproar was not the issue of ownership; it is a widely acknowledged fact that after Jews, Muslims
make up the largest buyers of kosher food; they do so willingly, consciously, and somewhat happily, knowing
that while the two standards are not identical, there is much overlap in some areas. The aspect of Al-Safa's
behavior that incensed the Muslims who learned of its ownership structure was not the manner in which
it went out of its way to relate to Muslim consumers, but the perception that this marketing crossed the
line into the realm of unacceptable deception. Al-Safa made it a point to sponsor local community events
that were 100% religious in nature, giving the appearance of a company that endorsed the contents and
purposes of the gatherings.195 It goes without saying that such endorsing companies typically tend to be of
the same religious persuasion. A further problem was the answering machine message, which rst lists two
Muslim-sounding names|who are in fact merely minimum-wage employees|and mentions the Anglo-name
of the main nancier/owner almost as an afterthought.196 The indignant reaction to this reality of ownership
can almost be predicted: when someone nds out, their jaws drop incredulously, and they point to the logo,
the sponsorships, and the Arabic script|all as a way of trying to rebut a bomb-shell of a revelation. Once
the feeling of having being duped settles in, the reaction is one of resentment. The groundswell of opposition
to Al-Safa has proceeded mostly by these means.197
The increased scrutiny applied to Al-Safa has produced a few other criticisms. One competitor, Misom Halal,
has alleged that Al-Safa has engaged in unsavory anti-competition practices, such as cutting out suppliers
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194Id.
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197Because of the poor communication channels in the Muslim community, this sentiment about Al-Safa is slow to spread.
Their products can be found at many of the local mom-and-pop halal stores in the Boston area.
49to Misom via exclusivity contracts with particular suppliers.198 The owner of Misom, Mansur Hojjatian,
points out that this forced cut in its relation with its supplier happened despite a two-year, healthy business
relationship. Misom argues that because of Al-Safa's scale, it can aord to oer glowing terms to suppliers
in the short run to drive the competition out of business.199 The fear that owners of until-now successful
small and mid-sized halal businesses like Misom have is that Al-Safa, through its aggressive distribution and
anti-competitive practices, will eventually dominate the market and do away with any need for Muslims to
deal with mom-and-pop shops.
While this is a trend plaguing small businesses in America more generally, it is particularly enraging to
concerned Muslims because of the religious dimension of the business that is being severed. Recall that some
Jewish certifying organizations will refuse to endorse companies that do not observe the Sabbath. The fact
that the company is Jewish is taken as a given, and here the level of religious observation is held to be of
paramount importance. In the case of Al-Safa, not only is a company not at all owned by Muslims|and
therefore by denition not practicing|but this company is by all accounts the leading player in this space.
Muslim community developers fear that this domination by an outside player will do much to strangle an
industry that by all accounts should be something that is operated by and for people of similar religious
persuasions.
The obvious retort to much of the above sentiment is that while it is understandable why many Muslims
were initially misled, it does not make sense why this revelation has not led to an anti-al-Safa boycott
campaign to drive the company out of business, or at minimum, demands to make the ownership structure
more transparent.200 In fact, according to Al-Safa's own accounts, business has never been better, and it
is readying itself to launch a bulk-order business in addition to its retail distribution practices.201 All of
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50these seeming negatives beg the question: why does a Muslim-operated non-prot (IFANCA) agree to certify
Al-Safa? It is this more than anything else that throws into full relief the theoretical problems of certiers
discussed at the outset of this section of the paper.202
ISNA|in so many words|has alleged that IFANCA has certied Al-Safa in order to collect large cer-
tication fees.203 In fact, by Al-Safa's own slip-of-the-tongue, it admitted to being in the nal stages of
a deal with IFANCA only three days after being ousted by ISNA.204 Less than a year later, Mazhar Hus-
saini, a co-founder and the executive director of IFANCA, resigned, citing disagreements over the company's
mandate. Hussaini charged, in quite explicit terms, that: \Given the direction that IFANCA has taken, I
personally do not think I can continue to be a part of this organization any longer. They are interested in
charging fees and certifying products (as Halal) and getting the commission."205 Others have pointed to the
fact that while it may have made logistical sense for ISNA to supervise Al-Safa because of their geographical
proximity|the two are both close to Toronto, approximately 30 minutes away from one another|the idea
of having a Chicago-based company (IFANCA) that has been perpetually undermanned and underfunded
raises too many ags. Observers have serious doubts that IFANCA's monitoring of Al-Safa will be at all
rigorous.206
The issues mentioned in theoretical tones earlier in the paper can all be seen manifesting themselves in
this case study. First, with respect to the troublesome nancial logic of certication, Al-Safa played its
cards correctly|one certier leaves, another rushes to take its place. By all accounts, IFANCA was a
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51small, unknown certier before taking on Al-Safa as a client.207 Its star rose with Al-Safa's, and has led
many insiders to murmur that perhaps attractive promises were made from Al-Safa to IFANCA about wider
business opportunities and exposure that would come with certication. Hussaini's resignation seems to give
much of these whisperings strong legitimacy. Second, the issue of transparency is in this context double-
edged. Al-Safa had been able to|and for the larger part of the Muslim community continues to|give an
arguably deceptive impression of who and what it is. However, the deeper level of transparency problems
exist with IFANCA itself. Neither its relationship with Al-Safa, how it goes about inspecting facilities in
another country with a skeleton crew that is underpaid and overworked, its commission and rate structure,
and its standards for halal|none of these things are close to being made clear to consumers.208 As one
writer puts it: \The claim of `open door policy' by Al-Safa and the claim of \strict standards for halal
food processing and marketing" by IFANCA seems nothing more than empty slogans."209 Finally the third
problem mentioned earlier was one of qualication: The directors of IFANCA are neither religious scholars
nor food technology experts.210
Part V: Conclusion
What the above example of Al-Safa illustrates is that the concerns mentioned earlier have in fact happened
and continue to happen. The fact that these problems involve the most visible halal food company and the
most visible halal certier borders on disastrous. Finally, the additional fact that nothing seems to be in the
works to address these problems|if anything, both IFANCA and Al-Safa seem to be on the ascent|shows
that the current model of certication needs to be modied in order for a halal regime to ourish in America.
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52A few broad-brush stroke suggestions should help to paint the contours of what a more successful halal
regime can look like. The rst has little to do with legal strategy and everything to do with education.
Muslim educators and religious centers need to step up their eorts in informing those who share their faith
that halal food is an absolute necessity, explaining that the substitute products consumed thus far do not
meet the religious requirements as exposited by the consensus, four-schools-of-thought approach.
Second, better coordination needs to take place between the organizations that are pushing for halal con-
sumer fraud laws and the local retail shops. Not much is achieved if protection laws are passed, but ordinary
consumers are not given access to purchasing quality halal food products. In other words, the legal develop-
ments and the business/market-and-need developments should proceed along similar timelines.
Third, there is a need to certify the certiers. Because of poor communication and less-than-stellar coordi-
nation, the average Muslim consumer is sometimes left in the dark on developments that are happening at
higher levels. The fact that Al-Safa is growing|despite the indignant reactions evinced by the overwhelming
number of Muslims who learn of the happenings|show that it is very likely that a large number of Muslims
are still unaware that a controversy even exists. Consumer Reports-like publications need to be developed,
so that consumers can have access to a third-party intermediary who can give reliable information about the
methodologies and reliability of the certiers themselves. The kosher New Jersey regime has shown that the
public-private hybrid is successful in Jewish practice. Until the Muslim community has a way of creating,
monitoring, and evaluating the brand of halal certiers, similar success will only be had in principle. This
policing function, either by a new organization or an existing one, is an absolute prerequisite for success.
Finally|relating to the suggestion above|these third-party \police of the police" have to zealously guard
their independence. The groups will ideally be non-prot, comprised of both professionals who have experi-
ence working in the food industry, and well-trained scholars who can give convincing answers to sophisticated
53questions about the use of new food technologies in manufacturing and distribution.
In many respects, the hard work has already been accomplished. Muslim public interest groups have cap-
tured the attention of State legislatures in passing a handful of halal consumer protection laws. In a sense,
the public half of the private-public hybrid has moved along rapidly. What is left to be done is a systematic
eort to bring market need up to speed with legislative victories.
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